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RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Respondents1 petition for rehearing does not present any points
of law which were overlooked or misunderstood by this Court.
Respondent's complaint that this Court's decision is restrictive
is merely an attempt to introduce new theories of the case or reargue
old theories which were rejected at trial.
Respondents1 claim that appellant's post-trial actions should
form the basis of a dismissal of this appeal is without merit and
contrary to the specific ruling of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals.

ARGUMENT

I.

RESPONDENTS1 PETITION FOR REHEARING DOES NOT PRESENT

ANY PROPOSITIONS OR QUESTIONS EITHER OF LAW OR FACT WHICH
WERE NOT FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.

The function of a Petition for Rehearing is to present to the
court errors of law or fact or both asserted to have been made by the
court. (L.'Abbe v. District Court 26 Colo 386 , 58 P 604)
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
in part:

The petition shall state with particularity the
points of law or fact which the petitioner claims
the court has overlooked or misapprehended.

Respondent (Bruno) argues that his allegations of theft against
appellant (Dorothy) constitute a fact that was not fully considered by
the court.

The record shows, however, that these allegations form

the main theory of Bruno's case.
proven at trial.

These allegations were simply not

Bruno would like to reopen this theory and do what

he failed to do at trial; namely, prove his theory.

o

Bruno did not

appeal this issue or any other issue.

This assertion has been fully

considered by both the trial court and this court
Bruno further argues that the trial court "determined that it
was not necessary to make a finding as to what occurred, because the
trial court held that the 1973 Agreement was not enforceable in any
event"
This statement by Bruno is a misstatement of the trial court's
ruling.

The trial court made no such finding.

As a matter of fact, the

trial court specifically recited both parties* version of the disputed
theft and declined to make any finding whatsoever on that issuec
Bruno cites the case of Noble v. Noble 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah
1988) as authority for his argument
distinguished.

Noble may be easily

Noble involved a trial court finding of tortious conduct

by virtue of the husband having shot the wife in the head.

After

partially recovering, the wife filed for divorce and the court awarded
substantial separate property to the wife which had belonged to the
husband.

The clear distinction in the present case is that no finding

was made that Bruno had even proven that a theft had occurred, let
alone who was supposed to have committed the offense.
Bruno continues to argue his version of the facts without
acknowledging that, after presenting four days' worth of evidence,
the trial court was not persuaded that Dorothy was involved in any
way.

Bruno next proposes that the 1973 Agreement was rescinded
by the conduct of the parties, and that this constitutes a new fact
which should be considered on rehearing.

Again, the theory of

rescission was at the heart of Bruno's case in the trial court.
However, the record does not support this theory.

The record does

support the decision issued by this court that the 1973 Agreement
was unambiguous, not entered into as a result of fraud or coercion or
material non-disclosure, and that it should be enforced pursuant to
its terms.

Bruno attempts to retry the issue of rescission, but

without evidence in the record to sustain his theory.
Again this argument is based upon Bruno's allegation that
Dorothy robbed Bruno of his records.

No finding was made

supporting this allegation and it remains as untrue as it is unproven.
Neither the issue of an alleged theft nor the issue of conduct
constituting a rescission constitutes law or fact which were
overlooked or misapprehended by this court.
Furthermore, any reference to case number 900223-CA is
irrelevant and improper in this court.

Dorothy was not a party to the

dispute between Bruno and his son, Eric, nor was she represented by
counsel in that case.

II.

RESPONDENTS1 COMPLAINT THAT THIS COURTS REVERSAL IS

OVERLY RESTRICTIVE IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE NEW

A

THEORIES OR REARGUE OLD THEORIES WHICH WERE REJECTED AT
TRIAL AND NOT APPEALED0

Bruno would like this court to permit the trial court enough
latitude to reconsider the issues of the alleged theft and rescission by
conduct of the parties in order to defeat the clear language of the
1973 Agreement and the intent of this court.
decline to do.
of the law.

This, the court should

This court's ruling is a fair and considered statement

Bruno should not be allowed to destroy the intent of the

1973 Agreement and this court's ruling in order to satisfy his own
purposes.
Bruno introduces a new theory of his case by suggesting that it
would be acceptable to him if the court determined that the
properties were separate and then proceeded to divide Dorothy's
separate property with Bruno,

This is an irrational attempt to

acknowledge what cannot be denied (the validity of the 1973
Agreement) and yet convey some or all of Dorothy's property to
Bruno under a theory of equity.
His argument that the property should be treated as separate
property, but that Dorothy's property should be divided with him, is
based upon the false premise that merely alleging theft and
rescission, which were not proven in the case, constitutes an
equitable reason to disregard the Agreement of the parties.
should not be allowed.

This

This court has stated:

. . . it is familiar doctrine that every pleader is
is required to state the cause of action or defense
upon which he relies; that a party in the trial
of a cause adopting a theory of the case is
generally bound by it, that a case must stand or
fall upon the theory upon which the complaint
is based, and that a party cannot take or adopt
a position in the trial court and thereafter urge
a different one on appeal . . . (Utah Copper Company v. District Court 91 Utah 377, 64 P.2d 241
(1937).)
The record shows that Bruno asserts the invalidity of the 1973
Agreement when it suits his purpose, asserts the validity of the 1973
Agreement when it suits his purpose, and that he now requests this
court to grant latitude to the trial court to disregard the intent of the
1973 Agreement and convey some or all of Dorothy's property to
him under its general equitable powers.

There is no evidence in the

record to support the existence of unique and compelling
circumstances which would justify disregarding an otherwise
enforceable

agreement.

In this case, the 1973 Agreement was executed, notarized,
recorded, deeds exchanged, and property valued at over $1,100,000
(ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS) transferred to
Bruno, and real estate and cash valued at over $500,000 (FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS) transferred to Dorothy. Thirteen
6

(13) years passed before Bruno filed for divorce and claimed the
Agreement was not binding,,

There is a difference between a long-

standing marital contract and a proposed stipulation that is
submitted for approval and inclusion in a divorce decree, as set forth
in the case of Coleman v. Coleman 743 P.2d 782 (1987).

Bruno's

reliance upon Coleman is not well-taken. The facts of Coleman do not
apply to this case nor does the reasoning.

Ill.

RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT APPELLANTS POST-TRIAL

ACTIONS SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF A DISMISSAL OF THIS
APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT AND CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT.

Under the original decree of divorce Dorothy was ordered to
pay approximately $236,800 (TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND
AND EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS) to Bruno. This Order became moot
when this court reversed the trial court on the issue of the validity of
the 1973 Agreement.
However, before ruling on the merits of this case, this court
required Dorothy to appear and submit to court process.
has done.

This she

(See Addendum Exhibit 1, page 4, line 12-15)

In addition, Dorothy was given 45 days to purge her contempt
by paying the foregoing sum to the courtc

Dorothy explained that she

was without any money and was caring for her cancer-ridden father.
i

The trial court then remarked "if the Appellate court doesn't reverse
this thing, affirms what I have done, then I think she is in deep
trouble,,"

(See Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 5, line 11) The trial court

knew that it might be reversed and that a reversal would render the
order of payment moot, because those funds were from Dorothy's
separate property under the 1973 Agreement.
The court then set a date for further hearing but qualified it as
follows:

I want to know the status of Mrs. D'Aston's
father. I want her back in court unless I
waive her coming back in . . . (Addendum,
Exhibit 1, page 2, line 21) . . . unless there is
some compelling reason why she can't be here.
If her father is on his death bed or something,
or if there's a funeral, or whatever (see Addendum, page 7, line 12 - 14)
This court has already noted that Dorothy complied with its
requirement to appear and submit to the trial court process.

Bruno's

assertion that Dorothy did not satisfy the trial court is not supported
by evidence of any kind.

8

CONCLUSION

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing does not present any
points of law or fact which were overlooked or misunderstood by
this court.
He proposes to produce additional evidence and adopt new
theories in order to obtain the original result.
In the alternative, he suggests that, because Dorothy was under
a contempt order, based upon a misapplication of the law, that she
should be denied her right of appeal on the merits.
Appellant respectfully urges the court to deny the Petition for
Rehearing and issue its remittitur to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with the decision therein.
DATED this 17th day of August, 1990.
Respectfully

submitted,

Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

o

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing Response to
Petition for Rehearing to S. Rex Lewis and Leslie W. Slaugh, 120 East
300 North, Post Office Box 778, Provo, Utah
this

go

84603, postage prepaid,

day August, 1990.
Brian C. Harrison
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ADDENDUM

1 1

1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTPICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY

2 I

STATE OF UTAH
* * *

3
4
5
6
7 I

DOROTHY

D'ASTON

g J

Plaintiff

9
)

10
vs.

n

Civil No.. CV-86-1124
ORDER

TRANSCRIPT

12
\l

| BRUNO

D'ACTON

14
.
15 |

Defendant.
>

16
17 I

BE IT,REMEMBERED that on Friday, the 4th day of

18

May, 1990, the ORDER - in the above-entitled

19

was taken by Richard C. Tatton/

20

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,

21

before the Honorable Boyd L. Park at the Utah County

a Certified

matter
Shorthand

22 J Courthouse, Provo, Utah
23
24
25

1

A P P E A R A N C E S

For t h e P l a i n t i f f :

Mr. B r i a n

Harrison

&

Mr. Don Mullin
Attorneys at Law
Provo, Ut'ah 84601

For the Defendant:

Mr. S. Rex Lewis
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah 84601

THE COURT:

Well what I am going to do I am goinc

to give you 30 days to purge yourself as I indicated.

Then

at the end of 30 days Mr. Harrison I want to know what
progress has been made in locating Lisa. I want to know
what the status is of Mrs. D1Aston1s father.

I want

her back in court unless I waive her coming back in
court but the jail time of 60 days will remain.

I will

review it before she is obligated to go to jail.

2

In order to do that I will give her 45 days
instead of 30 days to purge herself6
MR. HARRISON:
days to pay the sum
THE COURT:

I haA/e jotted down that it is 45

of $236,800.00.
Yes and either deposit with the court

or into a agreeable acceptable trust account.
MR. HARRISON:

Or secondly

and then within that

45 days - THE COURT:-

If she doesn't have it within 45

days , well if she doesn't have it within 40 days you need
to apprise the court as to the situation of her father
and what has been done to locate Lisa.
MR. HARRISON:

Okay.

I do believe I have

my phone number of Lisa and her boyfriend.

I may

have have the address as of the time of trial.

I will

do what I can to follow any leads.
THE COURT:

Lisa is a defendant in this action

and as far as I am concerned she is still, the court
still has jurisdiction over her.
MR. HARRISON:

I would note for the record it seei

to me as the thing has unfolded

obviously at one time

I represented all three defendants.

I think I am clearly

in a conflict of interest now,
THE COURT:

Well you have already withdrew from

representing the other two*

3

MR, HARRISON:
THE COURT:
something concrete

Right.

Be that as it may I want to see
about Mrs, D'Aston attempting to locate

Lisa,
MR, HARRISON:

Right,

THE COURT: Then the court will consider
at that time whether imposing the 60 days at that time or not.
.1 will review the matter,
MR. HARRISON:
Court of Appeals matter

Your Honor, with respect to the
what is.the court's feeling about

that?
THE COURT:

Well the Court

of Appeals says she

has 30 days from the day of the issuance of this opinion
to bring herself within the process of the trial court.*
•She had done that,
MR. HARRISON:

What I did is prepare an order

for the court to sign that merely says that she has
submitted herself to the process by the court pursuant
to this order, would that refect it accurately?
THE COURT:

You and Mr. Lev/is can argue in front cj

the Appellate Court whether or not that meets their
requirement.
Any objections Mr. Lewis?
MR. LEWIS:

No she has appeared

I assume that she)

is still in contempt of the court?

4

1

THE COURT:

Yes you may add

that she is in

2

contempt of court and the court has given her an opportunity

3

to purge herself with 45 days c

4

MR. LEWIS:

Maybe iftterlineate that on there?

5

THE COURT:

Let's type it up and include that.

$

MR. LEWIS:

You want Mr. Harrison to do it or

8

THE COURT:

Probably

9

MR. HARRISON:

7

10

roe?
Mr. Harrison to do it.

What does the court want me

to add?
THE COURT:

11

You need to add to that that she

12

is still in

contempt of the court.

The court has given

13

her 45 days to purge that contempt after which the court

14 I will review the matter in the event she hasn't purged
15

herself from that.

lg

reverse this thing , affirms what I have done, then I

17

think she is in deep trouble/

lg

MR. LEWIS:

19

If the Appellate Court doesn't

What about preparing the order that

the court has just made?
THE COURT:

Yes that order

22 I

MR- LEWIS:

I will prepare that

2|

THE COURT:

Yes you prepare that,

24 i

MR. LEWIS:

Are you going to set a date certain

20

needs to be made a;

well.

25 I to come back into court?

1

THE COURT:

I think we need to set a date certain

About 40 days down the road. What have you got Diana.

2
3

THE CLERK:

Friday afternoon, Judge?

4

THE COURT:

That will be fine.

5

THE CLERK:

June 15th?

g

MR. HARRISON:

Mot good for me about about the

22nd?

7

THE COURT:

That will be fine.

I

THE CLERK:

1:30.

JQ 1

THE COURT:

All right we will review it on

g

9

!j
., J

13
!4
15
16

June 22nd at 1:30.
MR. HARRISON:

With respect to the Bench Warrant

I assume that the court would/then order that be withdrawn?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HARRISON:

That would be included in Mr.

Lews' order?

17

THE COURT:

Yes.

jg

MR. HARRISON:

I also would have no objection to Mfl

19

Lewis putting language in

20

change her address that she would notify the court

21
22

there that should Mrs. D'Aston

within a week of her new address.
THE COURT:

Well pursuant to this decision by

23

the Appellate Court I think we have jurisdiction as long as

24

you are around.

25

MR. HARRISON:

That seems like a new law Judge

6

it seems to me.
THE COURT: But I think that is your obligation
to see that to know where yout client is at.
to put it in the order he may.

If he wants

But it is your oblignti-on

to know where your client is and how to get a hold of
her and if the court or anybody else needs her address
then you should furnish that.
MR. HARRISON:

Fine.

THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. LEWIS:

Continuing it to that date and is

the defendant to appear on that date in court?
THE COURT:

Yes unless there is some compelling

reason why she can't be- here.

If her father is on his

death bed or something or if there is a funeral or whatever
MR. LEWIS:

The order she is to be here unless

modified for some reason I suppose?
THE COURT:

Yes, put that in the order.

Mrs. D'Aston I am being extremely lenient with you.

Once I

.allow this sort of thing to go on in the court's order
to be held in contempt I don't know who else is going
to come along and think they can do the same thing.

I just|

hope you appreciate what a difficult position you have
put this court in when it could have been solved.
just do not understand

I

why you should think you should have]

to give all of this money to ypur daugther.

Unless she has

7

1

had a complete change of personality or something as to

2

why you would even trust her with it.

3

me.

4

That is beyond-'

All right anything further?

5

MR.HARRISON:

6

MR. LEWIS:

No.

7

THE COURT:

Court will be inrecess.

8

THE BAILIFF:

9
10
II

n
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

No, ^our Honor.

Everyone please arise.

will be in recess.
(WHEREUPON, this order was concluded)

Court

1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2
3
4

5

STATE OF UTAH

6

COUNTY OF WASATCH )

•ss

7
8
9

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the ORDER TRANSCRIPT

10

was reported by me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused

It

by me to be transcribed into typewriting by Richard c. .

12

Taton and that a full, true and correct transcription of

13

said TRANSCRIPT was so taken.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or

14

15

otherwise associated with any of the parties to said

16

cause

17

thereof.

of action and that I am not interested in the event

18
19

WITNESS my hand ancf official seal at Midway, Utat
this

//i^

day of May, 1990.

20

21

RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR

22
23
24

25

My commission expires:
June 15. 1993

'* SJrsa _ ^
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